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STATE GLADIATORS GO HIGH TECH WITH
RECORDS - WILL THE FEDS FOLLOW?
DANIEL R. MURRAY & TIMOTHY J. CHORVAT*
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 represented a major
advance, ensuring that a uniform and predictable set of principles would govern the
admission of evidence in federal courts throughout the United States. A parallel
development occurred at the state level with the promulgation by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1974 of a state court code
of evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Spurred by the advent of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence achieved widespread adoption
by the states2 and thus extended progress made at the federal level by promising
similar uniformity, accessibility, and predictability for the states that adopted those
rules.
Both the Federal Rules and the Uniform Rules have adapted over time to
changing realities in the courtroom, and for the most part the two codes have stayed
closely aligned, thus maximizing the utility of both. In the late 1990s, however, the
Federal Rules and the Uniform Rules moved in different directions in response to
the challenge presented by evidence that increasingly appears in forms other than
traditional paper documents? Based on a conclusion that courts generally have
* Daniel R. Murray and Timothy J. Chorvat are members of the firm of Jenner & Block, LLC, and
are members of the Illinois bar. Mr. Murray was the co-chairman, and Mr. Chorvat was a member, of
the Task Force on Electronic Evidence, Subcommittee on Electronic Commerce, Committee on Law of
Commerce in Cyberspace, Section on Business Law of the American Bar Association, which made
several recommendations, including the definition of "record," that were included in the 1999 version of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
1. Prior efforts at codifying the law of evidence made by the American Law Institute and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the "National Conference") are
summarized in Leo H. Whinery, The American Version of the Rules of Evidence - Can They Be
Improved?. 195 F.R.D. 57, 59-62 (1999).
2. The 1988 text of the Uniform Rules of Evidence is now in effect in thirty-nine states. See
ALASKA R. EVID. 101-1101; ARmz. R. EvID. 101-1103; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-101 to 16-41-1102
(Michie 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. title 13 app. EviD. 101 to 1102; CONN. SUP. Cr. ORDER 99-2; DEL.
R. EvID. 101-1103; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101 to 90.958 (West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 626-1 to
626-3 (1999); IDAHO R. EVm. 101-1103; IND. R. EVID. 101-1101; IowA R. EVID. 101-1103; KY. R.
EvID. 101-1104; LA. CODE EvID. arts. 101-1102; ME. R. EVID. 101-1102; MicH. R. EVID. 101-1102;
MINN. R. EvID. 101-1 101; Miss. R. EviD. 101-1103; MONT. R. EvID. 100-1008; NE. REV. STAT. §§
27-101 to 27-1103 (1999); NEV. R. STAT. §§ 47.020 to 52.295 (1999); N.H. R. EvID. 100-1103; N.J. R.
EviD. 101-1103; N.M. R. EviD. 11-101 to 11-1102; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-I, Rules 101 to 1102 (2000);
N.D. R. Evil,. 101-1103; Otno R. EviD. 101-1103; 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-3103 (West 2000);
OR. R. EvID. 100-1103; R.I. R. EViD. 100-1008; S.C. R. EVID. 101-1103; S.D. CODIFiED LAWS §§
19-9-1 to 19-18-9 (Michie 1999); TENN. R. EVID. 101-1008; Tax. R. EvID. 101-1009 (2001); UTAH R.
EviD. 101-1103; VT. R. EviD. 101-1103; WAsH. R. EvID. 101-1103 (2001); W.V. R. EViD. 101-1102;
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01 to 911.02 (2000); WYo. R. EVID. 101-1104.
3. The explosion in use of paperless media in commerce is noted in Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin &
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adapted well to that development, the Federal Rules have not undergone any broad
revisions to make them more receptive to electronic evidence! By contrast, the
1999 revisions to the Uniform Rules represent exactly that sort of general adaptation
to the new reality, following up on similar changes to the Uniform Commercial
Code and other statutes.
In this article, we argue that the Federal Rules of Evidence should be amended
to follow the lead of the Uniform Rules5 in order to restore uniformity between
jurisdictions, enhance accessibility and predictability, and promote the reception of
electronic records into evidence. In particular, this article explores the development
of approaches in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence
to the admission of what is sometimes referred to as electronic evidence, that is to
say, records preserved in media other than paper documents. Those approaches
culminated in the development of the term "record," which, in 1999, was adopted
as part of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. This article concludes that the adoption
of "record" represents an important advancement in the Uniform Rules, and suggests
that the Federal Rules of Evidence should adopt that defined term in order both to
restore uniformity to this area of the law and to promote medium neutrality in
evidence law.
L The Starting Point: Diverse, Inaccessible, and Unpredictable Evidentiary Rules
Before the uniform law movement achieved any significant success in har-
monizing rules of evidence - horizontally, with respect to the states, or vertically,
as between the federal and state government - the hodgepodge of evidentiary rules
that then prevailed placed a premium on the "hometown" advantage. That is to say,
a litigator from outside the jurisdiction or, for that matter, a young lawyer not
Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up To The Task?, 41 B.C.
L. REv. 327, 327-29 (2000); Christine Sgarlata Chung & David J. Byer, The Electronic Paper Trail:
Evidentiary Obstacles to Discovery and Admission of Electronic Evidence, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5,
10-11 (1998). See also Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence -A New Dimension
to Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARsHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 414-25 (1999) (surveying the variety
of paperless evidence).
4. For approximately the first two decades of the existence of the Federal Rules of Evidence, no
separate committee existed to survey the need for modifications to the rules or to propose modifications
to the Supreme Court of the United States. The creation of such a committee was advocated in Margaret
A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFMSrIA
L. REV. 255, 277 (1984). Until the creation of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence
(the Advisory Committee), changes in the rules were minimal. See Whinery, supra note 1, at 66-68.
Even after the appointment of the Advisory Committee, however, no wholesale review or overhaul of
the rules was undertaken. See Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Evid. of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Minutes of Nov. 12, 1996 meeting, 1996 WL 936790, at *9; see also Paul R. Rice
& Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short History of Too
Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000).
The Advisory Committee, which was appointed and commenced work in the 1990s, is not to be
confused with the Drafting Committee described in the text accompanying infra note 6, which prepared
the original draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the early 1970s.
5. Unless otherwise indicated, all textual references and citations to the "Uniform Rules" or
"Uniform Rules of Evidence" refer to the Uniform Rules of Evidence as last revised in 1999.
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steeped in the experience of practicing before a particular judge with his own
idiosyncratic rules of evidentiary practice based upon state law, would be at a
distinct disadvantage. It was precisely to even that playing field that the proponents
seeking the adoption of federal rules of evidence argued for a uniform set of rules
that would apply throughout the federal court system without regard to the state in
which each court was located.
The proponents argued for a common set of rules on two levels. First, they
argued that judges in the federal system would not have to be acquainted with
separate rules in each jurisdiction in which they sat. For example, judges visiting
in other circuits would not be impeded by having to use unfamiliar rules of
evidence. Also, judges sitting on courts of appeal encompassing a number of
jurisdictions would not have to be familiar with the rules of evidence in each
jurisdiction. Second, trial lawyers themselves would not be hampered when they
tried a case in a jurisdiction other than their own. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., the
chairman of the United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Evidence, described the advantages of having federal rules of evidence as
follows:
These rules, when they go into effect, will afford the trial lawyer a
handy pamphlet he can carry in his briefcase, and even in his pocket.
We will have a pamphlet of rules for the first time in the history of this
nation, not only resting on the judge's bench, but in the hands of the
gladiators trying the case in the courtroom
In response to a question from Congressman Wiley Mayne, Mr. Jenner pointed out
that the rules would be of even more assistance to a young lawyer who would be
able to find in the rules an authoritative answer to an evidentiary question and thus
would be on a par with a more experienced lawyer who would otherwise know the
practice of the judge from experience. As Mr. Jenner pointed out, "[W]e all start
on an even basis with this set of rules."7
Consequently, with the widespread adoption of the pre-1999 version of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence in thirty-nine states, there is now a uniform set of rules
that is readily accessible to the judge and the "gladiators" who are trying the case
in the courtroom. Accessibility is achieved because there is a set of rules set forth
in one text that can readily be adverted to as issues arise. Uniformity exists at the
state level because the evidentiary rules laid out in the Uniform Rules of Evidence
largely conform within the geographic area encompassed by the thirty-nine states
that have adopted those rules. In addition, because the Uniform Rules have largely
tracked the Federal Rules of Evidence over the years, uniformity is achieved not
only horizontally among the states but also vertically as between the federal and
state systems!
6. Hearings on Reform of Fed. Criminal Laws Before the Special Subcomn of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 34 (1973).
7. Id.
8. The lack of attention in the field of evidence to vertical choice-of-law issues is criticized in Earl
2001]
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Precisely because of the benefits arising as a result of having a set of uniform
rules in the hands of judges and the "gladiators," the drafters of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence have not generally departed from the model provided by the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The fact that the Federal Rules and a majority of the states'
evidence rules track one another enhances their accessibility.
Uniformity and accessibility are critical ingredients in achieving a judicial process
that operates in both a fair and efficient manner. The "hometown" advantage is
minimized. The disparity between the experienced attorney with knowledge of
anecdotal local evidentiary practice and the young attorney fresh out of law school
is likewise reduced. The playing field is leveled so that the result of litigation more
likely accords with a just result rather than a result placing a premium on
evidentiary gambits
11. Electronic Evidence in an Age of Paper: Developments
in the Federal Rules of Evidence
Any attempt to structure rules on the admissibility of items into evidence
inevitably must confront the issue of the types of material that will be governed by
such rules. Thus, for example, the original drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
made the rules applicable to "writings." Subsequent efforts were made to expand
the applicability of the rules to a broader class of materials that would include items
other than "writings." An effort was made to capture information that was not
stored in written format but rather was kept in another form, what we would think
of today as an electronic form. From today's vantage point, the term "data
compilation" hardly seems adequate to cover that broad scope - essentially every
possible form of information storage and transmission other than paper. The drafters
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, were not writing on a clean slate. The
explanation for their selection of "data compilation" lies in earlier amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The use of the term "data compilation" was first employed at the federal level in
a 1970 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - specifically, an
amendment to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning
document requests. The drafters of the rule confronted the problem of how to craft
a definition of "document" that would encompass not only writings but also
information stored electronically. The rule as amended provided that "any party may
serve on any other party a request to produce . . . any designated documents
(including writings,.. . , photographs, phono records, and other data compilations
from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent
through detection devices into reasonably useable form)."'0 The Advisory Commit-
tee Notes to that rule described the change as necessary "to accord with changing
C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82
G o. L.J. 1781, 1783-84 (1994).
9. For an evaluation of the extent to which the Federal Rules of Evidence after their first decade
of existence had achieved the advantages claimed by its proponents, see Berger, supra note 4.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
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technology."" Curiously, while the drafters took pains to include "data com-
pilations" within the definition of "documents" for purposes of Rule 34, no such
attempt was made in the terminology on scope of discovery contained in Rule 26(b).
Rule 26(b) extends the scope of discovery to include "any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things."'2
That term, "data compilation," was in turn incorporated by the Drafting
Committee of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the early 1970s. Rule 803(6), for
example, sets forth the business record exception to the hearsay rule. It exempted
from the hearsay rule "[riecords of regularly conducted activity," which were
defined to include
[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of
acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time
by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memoran-
dum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee notes, 1970 Amendment, subdivision (a). The Advisory
Committee Notes reflected a focus by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on the problem of
translating data from electronic form into perceptible hard copy form as part of the discovery process:
The inclusive definition of"documents" is revised to accord with changing technology.
It makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data compilations from which information
can be obtained only with the use of detection devices, and that when the data can as a
practical matter be made usable by the discovering party only through respondent's
devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to translate the data into usable
form. In many instances, this means that respondent will have to supply a print-out of
computer data. The burden thus placed on respondent will vary from case to case, and the
courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against undue burden or
expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering party pay costs.
Similarly, if the discovering party needs to check the electronic source itself, the court
may protect respondent with respect to preservation of his records, confidentiality of
nondiscoverable matters, and costs.
Id. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee's focus on translating electronic data into a computer printout
suggests that the Committee envisioned the application of the process prescribed by the rule in the
context of the technology available at that time - viz., a mainframe computer containing data, which
would then be reported in perceptible form by the production of a computer printout through a printer
attached to that mainframe computer. That model, of course, has become inadequate as a host of devices
that employ the storage and processing of electronic items have been developed. See Robins, supra note
3, at 414-21.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The omission of any reference to "data compilations" might be accounted
for by the express reference in Rule 26(b) to "documents," which is subsequently defined in Rule 34 to
include "data compilations." Cf. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 343-44 (noting that it "also could
be argued, however, that the Advisory Committee . . . knew how to make express reference to
computerized data when it wished to, such as in the case of its comments regarding Rule 34, and that
the lack of any such reference in Rule 26 and its comments indicates that the Committee did not wish
to incorporate computerized data within the scope of Rule 26").
2001]
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information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness. 3
The drafters did not make an effort to define the term "data compilation" or its
companion terms "memorandum," "report," or "record."
The lack of clarity in definition was compounded in Rule 1001, which set forth
definitions solely for purposes of article X on "Contents of Writings, Recordings
and Photographs." Subsection (1) of that rule provided: "'Writings' and 'recordings'
consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting,
typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or
electronic recording, or other form of data compilation."' 4 The phrase "other form
of data compilation" appended at the end of the definition is confusing in at least
two respects. First, the phrase "other" suggests an alternative to one or more of the
items contained in the preceding series of words, though precisely which of the
preceding words is referred to is not clear. It may refer to some form of data
compilation other than a mechanical or electronic recording. Alternatively, it may
refer to some form of data compilation other than a magnetic impulse or mechanical
or electronic recording. Plausibly, though it is unlikely, given the technology
available at the time of the phrase's drafting, it could even refer to all of the nouns
in the preceding series, starting with handwriting." Second, the definition appears
to suggest that "data compilation" would be termed a "writing" or a "recording," a
concept that would have been revolutionary at the time if it had been imported, for
example, into the interpretation of the requirement of a writing for purposes of the
Statute of Frauds. It may have been precisely that concern which led the drafters
of the Federal Rules of Evidence to restrict the application of the definitions in Rule
1001 solely to article X, thereby eliminating the possible use of the definition in
other articles of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In any event, as suggested in the
Advisory Committee Notes, the focus of the drafters in confecting Rule 1001 was
unequivocally on the so-called "best evidence rule" prescribing when an original
item of evidence was required. 6
13. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
14. FED. R. EvID. 1001(1).
15. Technology currently available, for example, includes handheld computer devices into which
data may be stored by writing by hand onto the device's screen.
16. The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule 1001(1) make clear the drafters' focus:
Traditionally the rule requiring the original centered upon accumulations of data and
expressions affecting legal relations set forth in words and figures. This meant that the
rule was one essentially related to writings. Present day techniques have expanded
methods of storing data, yet the essential form which the information ultimately assumes
for usable purposes is words and figures. Hence the considerations underlying the rule
dictate its expansion to include computers, photographic systems, and other modem
developments.
FED. R. EvID. 1001(l) advisory committee notes to 1972 Proposed Rules. The model evidently in the
mind of the drafters of the rule, like the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, appears to have
been primarily a mainframe computer storing words and figures that could then be displayed by means
of a hardcopy computer printout produced from a printer attached to the computer.
[Vol. 54:573
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While we have found no reported case that specifically declines to admit evidence
of an electronic nature because it did not qualify as a data compilation, a number
of commentators have noted the inadequacy of the term. With advances in
technology, the question of whether the most recently developed varieties of
electronic evidence fall within the rubric of "data compilation" has arisen. 7 The
issue has been raised, for example, whether a "cookie" or cache file appearing on
a Web site and automatically downloaded onto the computer of a user visiting that
site, without the knowledge or consent of the user of the computer, is a document
within the meaning of Rule 34(a)."' Similarly, some programs will embed data in
a document without the consent of the preparer of the document - e.g., most word
processing programs will record information as to when a specific document is
created and/or edited and the amount of time spent editing the document without
obtaining anyone's consent to do so. Commentators have questioned whether such
information constitutes a "compilation."'9
Moreover, beyond the potential for confusion in the term "data compilation," the
lack of an explicit provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence supporting the
admission of nonpaper records may have inclined courts against admitting such
records into evidence. A recent and colorful example of hostility toward the
Thus, subsection (3) of the same rule provides that "[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar
device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an
'original'." FED. R. EvID. 1001(3). Although the phrase "or other output readable by sight" suggests
contemplation of the possibility of other methods of translating the data into perceptible form, the
Advisory Committee Note to that rule indicates that the drafters had in mind the model of a computer
printout: "Similarly, practicality and usage confer the status of original upon any computer printout."
FED. R. EviD. 1001(3), advisory committee notes to 1972 Proposed Rules (citing Trans. Indem. Co. v.
Seib, 132 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1965)). In the Seib case cited by the Committee, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed rulings of the trial court admitting into evidence a printout of a database stored on
a computer over objections that an adequate foundation had not been laid and that the exhibit had been
prepared for purposes of the litigation. The opinion does not reflect whether any objection on the basis
of the best evidence rule was lodged and does not discuss the printout's admissibility under that rule,
even though the case is cited by the Advisory Committee in its discussion of that rule.
17. Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 346-47.
18. Id. at 347.
19. Id. Judge Scheindlin and Mr. Rabkin questioned whether such information, while presumably
"data" in a generic sense, is a "compilation" in the ordinary sense of "something composed out of
materials taken from other preexisting documents. Rather temporary, backup, cookie, cache and history
files all represent examples of a sui generis family of computer-created information." Id. at 347. Judge
Scheindlin and Mr. Rabkin argue:
Embedded data, Web caches, history, temporary, cookie and backup files - all of which
are forms of electronically-stored information automatically created by computer programs
rather than by computer users - do not obviously fall within the scope of the term
"documents." Certainly they are not "documents" in any traditional sense. Furthermore,
they arguably do not constitute "compilations" of data, as that term is commonly
understood. They are, in essence, a new breed of information, a breed not easily
categorized within the scope of Rule 34(a).
Id. at 372. Because of the inadequacies of that terminology, they have recommended revisions of the rule
in order "to accord with changing technology." Id. at 371 (quoting FmD. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory
committee notes. 1970 Amendment, subdivision (a)).
2001]
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admission of evidence in electronic form is contained in St. Clair v. Johnny's
Oyster & Shrimp, Inc? In that case, the plaintiff brought claims against Johnny's
Oyster & Shrimp for personal injuries the plaintiff allegedly sustained while
employed as a seaman for the defendant aboard the vessel Capt. Le'Brado. The
defendant sought to have the complaint dismissed on the ground that the defendant
never owned the vessel in question. The plaintiff responded that the defendant did
indeed own the vessel and, in support of that assertion, cited data downloaded from
an Internet site posted by the United States Coast Guard's online vessel database.2'
The court conditionally denied defendant's motion to dismiss, placing upon the
plaintiff the burden to obtain documents, within a very short period of time, that
would establish that the defendant owned the Capt. Le'Brado. In doing so, the court
displayed open hostility to the form of the evidence put forth by the plaintiff:
Plaintiffs electronic "evidence" is totally insufficient to withstand
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. While some look to the Internet as an
innovative vehicle for communication, the Court continues to warily and
wearily view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and
misinformation. So as to not mince words, the Court reiterates that this
so called Web provides no way of verifying the authenticity of the
alleged contentions that Plaintiff wishes to rely upon in his Response to
Defendant's Motion. There is no way Plaintiff can overcome the
presumption that the information he discovered on the Internet is
inherently untrustworthy. Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No
web-site is monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein is
under oath or even subject to independent verification absent underlying
documentation. Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that hackers can
adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at any time.
For these reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for
almost nothing, even under the most liberal interpretation of the hearsay
exception rules found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 807.
Instead of relying on the voodoo information taken from the Internet,
Plaintiff must hunt for hard copy back-up documentation in admissible
form from the United States Coast Guard or discover alternative
information verifying what Plaintiff alleges."
Although the issue in St. Clair is distinct from the definitional problem with "data
compilation," both situations demonstrate that the evidence rules need to address
20. 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Texas 1999).
21. The United States Coast Guard maintains a vessel database that includes information concerning
vessel characteristics, documentation, and ownership. The database is updated and revised on a quarterly
basis. The Web site in question can be found at Commercial Fisheries, http'//www.st.nmfs.govlstl/
commercial/landings/cg.vessels.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
22. 76 F. Supp. 2d at 774-75. St. Clair was cited with approval in United States v. Jackon, 208
F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 973 (2000). In that case, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a ruling denying admission to certain Internet Web postings.
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paperless records more directly than did the pre-1999 versions of either the Federal
Rules or the Uniform Rules.
III. Other Failed Efforts to Capture the Concept
In its clumsy attempt to capture the concept of electronic evidence, the term "data
compilation" is reminiscent of another term that was introduced by the 1958 text of
article I of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), and which still appears in the
definitions set forth in that article. Subsection 41 of section 1-201 defines the term
"telegram" to include "a message transmitted by radio, teletype, cable, any
mechanical method of transmission, or the like."' That definition is deceptively
described as "new" in the current text of Official Comment 41 to section 1-201.'
Despite the suggestion of the official comment, the definition of telegram has
remained undisturbed in the U.C.C. since the adoption of the original text in 1958.
It is a definition that is wedded to the technology of the 1950s. It does not, for
example, envision the possibility of messages communicated not mechanically, but
electronically through a digital version of transmission. Because the definition of
"telegram" became so quickly outmoded, it has remained in the U.C.C. not only
undisturbed but apparently largely unused. Not a single reported case interpreting
that definition during the forty-plus years of its existence has been found by the
authors. In short, the concept has proven distinctly unhelpful.
Another definition appearing in article I of the Uniform Commercial Code was
also viewed, on its face, as inadequate to capture the concept of information stored
in media other than in written form. The terms "written" or "writing" are defined
in section 1-201(46) of the U.C.C. as follows: "'Written' or 'writing' includes
printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to tangible form."' While
some commentators argued that the phrase "any other intentional reduction to
tangible form" could be interpreted to refer to the saving of information onto a
computer disk or drive, that view has not enjoyed widespread acceptance. As a
consequence, reformers seeking to expand the scope of the U.C.C. to nonwritten
media sought to redefine existing concepts; for example, reformers suggested
modifications to the definition of "writing" set forth in section 1-201(46).Y Many
concluded, however, that an attempted redefinition was bound to fail because
existing concepts, such as "writing," would have to be used in their traditional sense
in specific instances in commercial law. The requirement for a tangible writing, for
example, would still be required under articles 3 and 7, which provide for the
23. U.C.C. § 1-201(41) (2000).
24. U.C.C. § 1-201 official comment 41 (2000). The fact that the Official Comment 41 to section 1-
201 still refers to the definition as "new" is a testament to the fact that until recently, the text of article
I has not been subject to any thorough revision since its original conception (other than conforming
changes occasioned by overhauls of other articles to the Uniform Commercial Code).
25. U.C.C. § 1-201(46) (2000).
26. Patricia Brumfield Fry, X Marks the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Concepts for
Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 607, 611 (1993).
27. Id. at 612-16.
2001]
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transfer of negotiable instruments with the transferee obtaining enumerated rights.
This led reformers seeking to accommodate commercial law to new forms of media,
which allowed them to explore the development of "new concepts.""
IV. The Pre-1999 Approach of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
Versions of the Uniform Rules of Evidence in effect prior to the 1999 text have
generally closely tracked the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the
approach to electronic evidence in particular did not diverge. Thus, for example,
Rule 1001(1) of the 1988 text of the Uniform Rules tracks almost word for word
the comparable rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence.' Similarly, Rule 1001(3)
duplicates the comparable provision of the Federal Rules? The earlier versions of
the Uniform Rules track the Federal Rules so closely because the National
Conference expressly charged the Drafting Committee to conform the Uniform
Rules to the Federal Rules as finally enacted "so far as practicable."'" The 1974
version of the Uniform Rules was said to "reflect as closely as possible" the Federal
Rules as finally enacted?
V. Making A "Record": The Evolution of a New Defined Term
The Working Group that sought to develop a new concept concluded that certain
principles would have to govern the development of new terminology. The first
necessary characteristic of any newly defined term was that it capture the idea that
any information referred to must be capable of being perceived or intelligible to
humans. That did not require that the information be stored in a form perceptible
by humans in the first instance, but simply that the information could be converted
into a form that would be perceptible or intelligible to humans.3 The second
characteristic identified by the Working Group was that the information must be
reliable and accurate. In other words, the method of storing information must
include the ability to retrieve the information at a later date in an accurate and
28. ld. Professor Fry's article describes in detail the history of the evolution of a "new concept."
The term emanated from discussions in the Working Group on Electronic Writings and Notices of the
Subcommittee on Electronic Commercial Practices of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee in the
Business Law Section of the American Bar Association (hereinafter the Working Group). Professor Fry
served as chair of the Subcommittee on Electronic Commercial Practices during the period in which the
new concept was developed.
29. UNIF. R. EvID. 1001(1), 13B U.L.A. pt. IB, at 648 (2000). The only variation is the addition
of the word "sounds" following "letters" and "words" in the enumeration of what constitutes a writing
or a recording.
30. UNIF. R. Eva,. 1001(3), 13B U.L.A. pt. IB, at 648 (2000).
31. UNIF. R. EvID. Prefatory Note to Original 1974 Rules of Evidence, 13A U.L.A. pt. IA, at 5
(2000).
32. ld.
33. Fry, supra note 26, at 618. This principle thus parallels the reference in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 34 to "other data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if
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reliable form As discussions advanced, the Working Group settled upon the
following definition of the concept it had in mind to replace the term "writing"
where a more flexible definition encompassing electronic media was desirable: "X
means a durable symbolic representation of information in objectively perceivable
form or susceptible to reduction to objectively perceivable form."s The Working
Group finally identified a word that it thought best captured the concept -
"record."'
The term "record" was subsequently refined and introduced into the Uniform
Commercial Code as articles of the U.C.C. underwent revision. The 1995.text of
article 5, covering letters of credit, incorporated the definition of record used in
section 5-102(a)(14): "Record' means information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium, or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in
perceivable form."' Similarly, the 1999 text of article 9 of the U.C.C. sets forth
the following definition in section 9-102(a)(69): "'Record', except as used in 'for
record', 'of record', 'record or legal title', and 'record owner', means information that
is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." The American Law Institute and
34. Fry, supra note 26, at 618-19.
35. Id. at 621.
36. Id. at 621-22.
37. U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(14) (2000). The term is used, for example, in section 5-104 setting forth the
formal requirements of a letter of credit. Instead of requiring that a letter of credit take the form of a
writing, revised section 5-104 permits a letter of credit to be issued "in any form that is a record." U.C.C.
§ 5-104 (2000).
38. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(69) (2000). The term is used throughout the 1999 text of article 9 of the
U.C.C. U.C.C. § 9-102 official comment 9(a) (2000). For example, one method by which a security
interest may attach to collateral is upon the authentication of a security agreement by the debtor. U.C.C.
§ 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2000). A debtor may authenticate a security agreement by either (A) signing it
(implying the existence of a writing) or (B) by eiecuting or otherwise adopting a symbol, or encrypting
or similarly processing a record with the present intent to adopt or accept a record. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7)
(2000). Clause (B) of the definition assumes that a security agreement can take the form of a record that
is not a writing.
The 1999 text also seeks to be "medium-neutral" in the rules governing the filing of U.C.C. financing
statements. U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment 4(h) (2000).
The 1999 text of article 9 took effect on July 1, 2001, in most of the states which have enacted it.
As of this writing, every state has adopted the revisions. See ALA. CODE §§ 7-9-101 to 507 (2000)
(effective January 1, 2002); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 45.29.101 to .709 (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. §§
47-9101 to 9708 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-101 to 507 (Michie 1999); CAL. UNIF. COM. CODE
§§ 9101-9708 (Deering 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 4-9-101 to 507 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42a-
9-101 to 507 (2001) (effective October 1, 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6. §§ 9-101 to 709 (2000); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 28:9-101 to 507 (1999); FLA. STAT. ch. 679.9-101 to 507 (2000) (effective January 1,
2002); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to 507 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 490:9-101 to 507 (1999);
IDAHO CODE §§ 28-9-101 to 507 (1999); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-101 to 99-02 (West 2000); IND.
CODE §§ 26-1-9-101 to 508 (1999); IOwA CODE §§ 554.9101 to .9507 (2000); KAN. U.C.C. ANN. §§
84-9-101 to 507 (West 1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 355.9-101 to 507 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-101 to 605 (West 2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9-1101 to 1507
(West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I §§ 9-101 to 507 (1999); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 9-
101 to 507 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 440.9101 to 9507 (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 336.9-101 to 507
(2000); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-9-101 to 507 (2000) (effective January 1, 2002); Mo. REV. STAT. §§Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
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the National Conference presently have under consideration a draft of article 1 that
would include a definition of "record" for use throughout the Uniform Commercial
Code.39
The term "record" has also been utilized in other uniform laws promulgated by
the National Conference - notably, the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, and
400.9-101 to 507 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-9-101 to 507 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 9-101 to
507 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 104.9101 to .9507 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 382-A:9-101 to
9-507 (2000); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:9-101 to 9-507 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-9-101 to
507 (Michie 2000); N.Y. U.C.C. LAw §§ 9-101 to 507 (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-9-101
to 507 (2000); ND. CENT. CODE §§ 41-09-01 to 53 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1309.01 to .50
(Anderson 2001); 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-9-101 to 507 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 79.1010 to 79.8010
(1999); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9101 to 9507 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 6A-9-101 to 507 (1999); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-9-101 to 507 (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 57A-9-101 to 507 (Michie
2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9-101 to 507 (1999); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101 to .507
(Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70A-9a-101 to 709 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 9-101 to
507 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.9A-101 to 507 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 62A.9A-101 to
507 (2000); W. VA. CODE §§ 46-9-101 to 507 (2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 409.101 to 409.507 (West
2000); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.1-9-101 to 507 (Michie 2000).
39. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(33a) (Annual Conference Meeting Draft, Aug. 16,2001). The definition, as
currently drafted, reads as follows: "'Record' means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." The same
definition also appears in current drafts of revised articles 2, 2A, 3, and 4. See U.C.C. § 2-103(IXI)
(Annual Conference Meeting Draft, Aug. 10, 2001); § 2A-103(1)(cc) (Annual Conference Meeting Draft,
Aug. 10, 2001); § 3-103(a)(1OA), § 4-104(c) (Discussion Draft, Feb. 2001). The proposed revision to
Article 1 received the approval of the American Law Institute and the National Conference at their annual
meetings in 2001. The proposed revisions to Articles 2 and 2A received the preliminary approval of the
American Law Institute at its annual meeting in May 2001, but await the final approval of the National
Conference and the American Law Institute.
40. UNiF. ELEc. TRANSACTIONS Acr §§ 1-21, 7A U.L.A. 28-68 (West Supp. 2001). As of this
writing, thirty-seven states have enacted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. See UNIF. ELEC.
TRANSACTIONS ACT, 2001 ALA. ACT 458 (2001) (to b6 codified at ALA. CODE §§ 8-1A-I to 20); ARiz.
REV. STAT. §§ 44-7001-7051 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-32-101 to 121 (2001); CAL. Civ. CODE
§§ 1633.1-1633.17 (Deering 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12A-101 to 117 (2000); 2000 D.C. STAT.
13-434 (approved Aug. 11, 2000); FLA. STAT. ch. 668.50 (2000); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 489E-I to 489E-
19 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 28-4-110 (Michie 2000); IND. CODE §§ 26-2-8-101 to 8-302 (2000); IOWA
CODE §§ 554D.101 to 554D.123 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-1601 to 16-1620 (2000); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 369.101 to 369.120 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); 2001 LA. ACT 244 (approved June 1, 2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 9401 to 9419 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw 11 §§ 21-101
to 21-120 (2000); MiCH. COMP. LAWs §§ 450.831 to 450.849 (2000); MINN. STAT. §9 325L.01 to
325L.19 (2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-12-1 to 39 (2001); 2001 MONT. LAWS 52; NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 86-2101 to 86-2116 (2000); 2001 NEV. STAT. 548; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 294-E:1-20
(2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-16-1 to 19 (Michie 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-311 to 66-330 (2000);
2001 N.D. LAws 1106 (approved Apr. 3, 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1306.01 to 1306.23 (2000);
12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 15-101 to 15-120 (2001); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2260.101 to 2260.312 (2001);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-127.1-1 to 42-127.1-20 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 53-12-1 to 53-12-50
(Michie 2000); 2001 TENN. PUB. ACTS 72; 2001 TEx. GEN. LAWS 702; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101
to 501 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-479 to 497 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE §§ 39A-1-t to 17
(2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-21-10 to 119 (Michie 2001).
Section 13 of the Act expressly precludes the exclusion of evidence solely because it is in electronic
form, stating, "In a proceeding, evidence of a record or signature may not be excluded solely because
it is in electronic form." UNIF. ELEC. TRANS. ACT § 13, 7A U.L.A. 53 (West Supp. 2001).https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss3/6
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the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act' The term has also been
utilized by the United States Congress in the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act' That Act establishes the general principle, subject to
specified exceptions, that, with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce, a signature, contract, or other record (as that term is defined
in 15 U.S.C. § 7006(9)) may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability
"solely because it is in electronic form . . . or . . . an electronic signature or
electronic record was used in its formation."'43 Unlike the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, the Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act does not include a provision expressly precluding the exclusion of
evidence solely because it is in electronic form." Even though the Federal
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act does not expressly deal
with the admissibility of electronic evidence, it nevertheless evidences a strong
congressional policy favoring giving full effect to electronic transactions.
VI. The 1999 Text of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
Precisely with the benefits of vertical, as well as horizontal, uniformity in mind,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has heretofore
attempted to conform the Uniform Rules of Evidence as closely as possible to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In formulating the 1999 text of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, however, the National Conference chose to diverge in several important
respects from the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It did so because it
thought that the benefit to be achieved by such a divergence substantially
outweighed the efficiencies effected by the adoption of uniform rules that provided
both horizontal and vertical harmony'
41. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSAcTIONS Acr § 102(a)(55), 7 U.L.A. 15 (West Supp. 2001). As
of this writing, two states have enacted the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. See MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAw II §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 59.1-509.3
(Michie 2001). Legislation has been introduced in eight states: Arizona, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas.
42. Electronic Signatures in Global & National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464
(West 2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7006(9) (2000)). This Act provides, "The term 'record'
means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." Id.
43. Section 101(a) of the Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
provides in its entirety:
Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this title and title
II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce -
(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied
legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its
formation.
Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2000)).
44. See supra note 40; cf Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures
Under the Federal E-Sign Legislation and the UETA, 56 Bus. LAW. 293, 297 (2000).
45. The National Conference, for example, specifically charged the drafters of the 1988 text of the
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One of the most striking areas in which the Uniform Rules of Evidence have
departed from the framework of the Federal Rules is with respect to changes that
the National Conference believed were necessary to take account of technological
developments in preserving electronic records as well as writings on paper. The
foundation of those modifications is the use of the term "record" in place of the
term previously used - "writing."
In drafting the Uniform Rules of Evidence, the Drafting Committee determined
it would make a new initiative with respect to capturing electronic evidence in all
of its variety. The Drafting Committee seized upon the concept of "record," as used,
among other places, in the Uniform Commercial Code. As described in the
Reporter's Note to Uniform Rule 101, "The definition of 'record['] in RULE 101(3)
is derived from § 5-102(a)(14) of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE and carries
forward consistently the established policy of the Conference to accommodate the
use of electronic evidence in business and governmental transactions. " '
The 1999 text of the Uniform Rules of Evidence sets forth an express definition
of the term "record" that will apply throughout the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 7
As a consequence, the 1999 text of the Uniform Rules eliminates the confusion that
afflicts the Federal Rules of Evidence and prior versions of the Uniform Rules, in
which the definitions in article X do not apply to other articles.
Rule 101 of the 1999 text of the Uniform Rules of Evidence defines "record" to
mean "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an
electronic form or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." As noted
Uniform Rules of Evidence to bring the language of the Uniform Rules into line with comparable
provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence wherever possible. No such charge was given the Drafting
Committee that produced the 1999 text. The Prefatory Note to the 1999 text explains this as follows:
The underlying theory [for the 1988 text's bias toward vertical uniformity] was,
apparently, that a trial practitioner need master only one set of rules to comfortably
practice in both federal and state forums located in various States, Districts, and Circuits.
However, in practice, this theory does not seem to work as well as expected. In operation,
the same words are often construed differently by different courts, even by sister federal
circuits and state jurisdictions. Thus, the careful lawyer must continue to research certain
rules of evidence on a case-by-case basis.
As a result, the current Drafting Committee has endeavored to draft the amended rules
in clear and reasonably understandable terms without slavish regard for other existing
work product.
UNIF. R. EVID. prefatory note, at 1.
The arguments for and against conforming the state rules of evidence to the federal rules are explored
in Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L.
REV. 293 (1990). The interplay between the development of state uniform law and federal law is
explored on a more theoretical basis in Nim Razook, Uniform Private Laws, National Conference of
Commissioners for Uniform State Laws Signaling and Federal Preemption, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. 41 (2000).
46. UNiF. R. EvID. 101 reporters notes.
47. UNIF. R. EviD. 101. The Reporter's Note states as follows:
RULES 101 and 102 have been reorganized to include a definitions rule as RULE 101. The
definitions in RULE 101 are of terms that are used throughout the UNIFORM RULES [OF
EVIDENCE] and have a generic application. In contrast, terms that have application only
in specific ARTICLES or RuLEs are separately defined in those ARTICLES or RULES.
UNIF. R. EVID. 101 reporter's note.
[Vol. 54:573
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in the prefatory note to the 1999 text of the Uniform Rules, the rules have been
reorganized so that the definition of "record" applies throughout the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, largely displacing references to writings or written documents'
The drafters' notes explain the adoption of this new terminology:
Although the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE prior to their amendment
included specific reference, when appropriate, to "data compilations" to
accommodate the admissibility of records stored electronically, many
business and governmental records do not now consist solely of data
compilations. Rather, in today's technological environment, records are
[or may be] kept in a variety of mediums other than in just data
compilations. "Records" may include items created, or originated, on a
computer, such as through word processing or spreadsheet programs;
records sent and received through electronic communications, such as
electronic mail; data stored through scanning or image processing of
paper originals; and information compiled into data bases. One, or all,
of these processes may be involved in ordinary and customary business
and governmental record keeping. Modem technology thus dictates that
any of the foregoing [types of] records should be admissible when they
are relevant if reasonable thresholds of evidentiary reliability are
satisfied. The RULE 101(3) definition of "record" and the amendments
to the UNIFORM RULES utilizing the term "record" are intended to
facilitate the evidentiary use of these innovations in record keeping as
well as more traditional forms of record keeping, such as writings,
recordings and photographs."
By using one defined term throughout the various articles of the Uniform Rules
of Evidence, with a carefully crafted definition capturing the meaning of the
concept, the drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence have supplied careful
draftsmanship in sharp contrast to the relatively loose use of terms in the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
VII. Federal Response to the Increasing Use of Electronic Evidence
A. The Advisory Committee's Deliberations
Because the terminology employed by the Uniform Rules of Evidence, as last
revised in 1999, represents a material improvement over the less-carefully drafted
and structured provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the changes effectuated
by the Uniform Rules of Evidence have been brought to the attention of the
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. At its meeting on November 12, 1996, in San Francisco, California, the
Advisory Committee took note of the fact that the Uniform Rules Drafting
48. See UNiF. R. EVID. 101, 106, 612, 801(a), 803(5)-(15), 803(17), 808, 901(b), 902(5), 902(6),
902(8), 902(9), 903, 1001(1). 1001(3), 1001(5), 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007.
49. UNI. R. EViD. 101 reporter's note.
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Committee proposed to revise every rule in which the term "writing" is used and
to substitute the word "record." The Advisory Committee observed that the Drafting
Committee of the Uniform Rules thought the change was necessary to "account for
technological developments in preserving writings and records.' The minutes of
that meeting appear to reflect the fact that the Advisory Committee was not
disposed to make a change in terminology. The minutes report:
The proposed change in the term "writings" in the Uniform Rules
engendered some discussion about technological advances and their
impact on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Judge Stotler pointed out that
the problem of electronic data cuts across all the rules, not only the
Evidence Rules, as we move toward the "electronic courtroom." The
Chair [the Honorable Fern M. Smith] observed that the problems
created by technological change are more problems of validity and
reliability than definitional. The Chair announced that in response to the
challenges created by new technology, Judge Stotler has formed a
subcommittee, consisting of one member from each of the advisory
committees, as well as the reporters from each advisory committee. The
purpose of this subcommittee is to consider how best to respond to
changes in data retrieval and presentation in the federal courts. Judge
Turner has been appointed by the Chair and has agreed to serve on the
technology subcommittee."'
At a meeting of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on January
8-9, 1998, in Santa Barbara, California, Judge Fern M. Smith reported that the
Advisory Committee on Evidence would also be considering whether amendments
to the Federal Rules of Evidence were necessary to accommodate technological
innovations in the presentation of evidence. She reported that, among other things,
the Advisory Committee would review Rule 1001 "to determine whether the terms
'writing' and 'recording' should be redefined and whether they should apply to the
entire body of the evidence rules."'
Thus far, the Advisory Committee has not promulgated a proposal to amend the
Federal Rules in the way that the 1999 amendments revised the Uniform Rules.
Instead, the Advisory Committee proposed a narrower group of amendments, which
resulted in the amendments that became effective on December 1, 2000.
B. The Curious Case of Federal Rule 902
The 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules themselves highlight the continuing
need to address nonpaper records. Consider the recent amendment to Federal Rule
902, which changed the Federal Rules of Evidence in a way that conforms with the
50. Advisory Comm. on Evid. Rules of Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of Nov.
12, 1996 meeting, 1996 WL 936790, at *3.
51. h
52. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Minutes of Jan. 8-9, 1998 meeting, 1998 WL 907428, at *58.
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1999 revision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The revision of Rule 902
represents a substantive advance, permitting parties to lay the foundation for the
admission of records of regularly conducted activities by way of declaration rather
than having to put on live testimony. By simplifying the procedure for authen-
ticating business records, the new Rule 902 ameliorates some of the risks of
admitting paper and electronic business records into evidence. From our perspective,
that is a good thing. That same revision, however, illustrates the lack of a consistent
definition of "record," and the lack of any equivalent term in the Federal Rules.
The language of new Rules 902(11) and 902(12) is similar, but not identical to
the new versions of the equivalent rules in the 1999 revisions to the Uniform Rules.
Among the features that Federal Rules 902(11) and 902(12) share with their
counterparts in the Uniform Rules, as revised in 1999, is that they use the word
"record" and use that word consistently with the definition of "record" in the
Uniform Rules. However, neither the text nor the comments to the 2000
amendments to the Federal Rules adopts or refers to that definition. That creates the
potential for confusion because "record" in Rule 902, subsections (11) and (12), is
being used in a way that is inconsistent with the use of that same word in Rule
803(6), which contains language that was not modified by the recent amendments.
.In Federal Rule 803(6), "record" is one of a series of words (along with
"memorandum," "report," and "data compilation") used to cover possible forms that
business records might take.' In new Rule 902(11) and (12), however, "record"
alone is used, and the context suggests that "record" is meant to cover the scope of
the entire series of words recited in Rule 803(6). For example, is it reasonable to
conclude that the new authentication procedure applies only to "records," whatever
those may be, but not to any other memoranda, reports, or data compilations, which
remain admissible under Rule 803(6) but are not eligible for authentication by
declaration? It is hard to imagine anyone recommending that position as a
normative matter, although the text of the rules would bear that interpretation. As
a result, it appears that by adopting only one piece of the 1999 revisions of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, the Advisory Committee elected to forego an
opportunity to clear up possible confusion about the rules governing admission of
electronic evidence and, by doing so, actually created a new source of potential
confusion."
In short, the 2000 revision of Rule 902 has exacerbated the need for a further
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence that provides and implements a
consistent definition of the word "record." The only logical candidate for that
definition is the one already in use in the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the
Uniform Commercial Code, among other enactments. Whatever the relative merits
of the substantive and linguistic arguments about such a modification to the Federal
53. FED. R. EVID. 902(11), (12).
54. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
55. To make matters even worse, Rule 803(6) was amended in 2000 to include a reference to Rule
902, but the use of "record" in that rule was unchanged, perhaps giving unintended credence to the
argument noted in the text. FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
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Rules prior to the recent amendments, that change is now necessary to bring the text
of the Federal Rules of Evidence into harmony with the apparent substantive
intentions of the Advisory Committee itself.
Conclusion
The 1999 revisions of the Uniform Rules of Evidence closely reflect the largely
undisputed policy that it should not be more difficult for properly authenticated
electronic records to be received into evidence than similarly genuine paper
documents. By using the term "record" in a way consistent with the use of that
word in the Uniform Commercial Code and other enactments, the 1999 revisions
to the Uniform Rules also enhance the predictability and uniformity of the law.
Unfortunately, the current version of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not share
those virtues. Accordingly, the Federal Rules should be amended to adopt the
definition and uses of "record" now in place in the Uniform Rules.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss3/6
